In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the first-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique. The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous distributions case and the discrete distributions case.
Introduction
In the early literature 1 on auction theory there are two papers that deal with the sale of one object by sealed bid first price auctions: Vickrey (1961) and Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik (1967) . Vickrey analyses a symmetric first-price auction with several bidders and a uniform distribution of types. He also analyses two asymmetric models. One with two bidders and two uniform distributions with distinct supports. His analysis is incomplete in this case and supposing one of the distributions degenerated he proceeds with a complete analysis. The paper by Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik gives a detailed treatment of the two firms with two distinct intervals of costs, uniformly distributed case. Perhaps these two papers justify the present predominance of the symmetric model. They show-by example-that even the most natural generalization 2 originates a forest of complications and a need for a very careful analysis. In this paper I consider private values, symmetric, first-price auctions. My focus will be conceptual. To understand my motivation let me look at two usual although diametrically opposite cases. The most common assumption on the distribution of bidders valuations, F : [a, b] → [0, 1], is that it has a strictly positive density, f = F . The equilibrium bidding function is easy to find 3 and has a nice interpretation: it is the expected value of the second highest valuation given that the bidder has the highest valuation. The opposite case of a discrete distribution is considered mainly for examples. 4 The equilibrium in the discrete case is in mixed strategies. There is also a kind of monotonicity in that a bidder with a higher valuation always bids higher than bidders with lower valuations. To see this briefly consider a two types distribution, say each type v ∈ {0, 1} occurs with probability 1 2 . Then a bidder with v = 0 bids 0 and a bidder with v = 1 bids in the interval [0, b] with probability
What is the equilibrium if the distribution, F , is not absolutely continuous and is not discrete? We will see that the symmetric equilibrium exists and has two parts. A pure strategy part at the points of continuity of F and a mixed strategy part at the points of discontinuities of F .
The second result of the paper is the unicity of the symmetric equilibrium. It is possible that the equilibrium be unique not only amongst the symmetric ones. This is probably very difficult to prove in the general case. For example the techniques of Maskin and Riley (2003) and more recently Lebrun (2006) uses differential equations.
The last result in the paper find the equilibrium if the set of types is multi-dimensional. This will be easy. Its main interest being to show that neither monotonicity nor continuity plays a role in the general case.
Preliminaries
In this section I collect some basic definitions and auxiliary results. I begin recalling the definition of a distribution.
2 Like distinct supports of uniform distributions.
. 4 Thus Riley (1989) use a discrete distribution to present in simple mathematical terms the revenue equivalence theorem. Throughout this paper I suppose that ∞ >v > v ≥ 0. Abusing notation, I denote by F the restriction F | [v,v] . This entails no confusion. Define C as the set of continuity of F | [v,v] and D the set of discontinuities of F | [v,v] . Then D is countable. 5 Moreover
As usual F (x−) := sup {F (y) ; y < x} = lim y↑x F (y). The following function is the main ingredient of the equilibrium strategy:
Remark 1 It is easy to check, using integration by parts that
This expression shows that b F can be interpreted as the expected value of the second highest valuation given that the highest valuation is v. If F has a density f we may rewrite b
.
In the next lemma I prove the basic properties of b F .
Lemma 1
The following properties are true:
5 Since F is monotonic.
(iii) b F is right-continuous, increasing and
Proof:
Thus using (i) above, 
Thus b is continuous at v if and only if F is continuous at v. Moreover b is discontinuous at v if and only if b(v−) < b(v).
(iv) This item follows from
QED The next lemmas finishes our preliminary work.
Since v − x ≥ 0 if and only if x ≤ v the last integral is maximized at y = v. QED Lemma 3 Suppose v ∈ D and v > v. Then the following is true:
is a continuous, strictly increasing distribution.
For any
Proof: (1) It is immediate that G v (b (v−)) = 0 and that G v is continuous. Moreover since v − b (v−) > 0 the function G v is strictly increasing. Finally using (3) we have that
QED

The equilibrium
There are n bidders participating in a first-price auction. Values are private and bidders types are independent identically distributed according to the distribution
The equilibrium is in mixed strategies. However it is not very wild. The mixed part occurs only at the discontinuities of F (which are countable). Moreover the support of the mixed strategies are non-intersecting and monotonic. The equilibrium strategy is composed of two parts.
Thus the pure strategy b (v) is played at the continuity points of the distribution and the mixed strategy G v is played if the distribution is discontinuous at v. I need the distribution of bids generated by M. The next two lemmas complete this step.
Lemma 4 For every
From the right-continuity of b we conclude that x ≤ b (ω r ). For any ω < ω r it is true that b (ω) < x and therefore b (ω r −) ≤ x. That ω r is the smallest is clear from its definition. QED The following corollary is follows immediately: Corollary 1 Let B i be the random variable of bidder i bids. The distribution of B i is
In particular Pr (B i = x) = 0 for every x > v.
Theorem 1
The mixed strategy M is a symmetric equilibrium of the firstprice auction.
Proof: Suppose bidders i = 2, . . . , n bids the mixed strategy M. Suppose bidder 1 has valuation v. The corollary above shows that if bidder 1 bids
x the probability of a tie is null. Thus if he bids
From lemma (5),
Since 6 φ increases in x if and only if v > y it follows that:
In any case
Thus y = v is the best reply. And if v is a point of discontinuity, x ∈ [b (v−) , b (v)] is bid accordingly to G v (·) is a best response. QED
Unicity of the mixed strategy equilibrium
In this section I show that the mixed strategy equilibrium M is unique.
is a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium. Then Υ = M.
To simplify the notation a bit I suppose v = 0. Define H i as the distribution of bids of i when Υ is played. Thus H = H 1 = . . . = H n and
Define also G as the distribution of the maximum bid of bidders j = i. Thus G (x) = H n−1 (x) . Denote by P the set of Borelean probabilities measures on R. The following lemma is basic. 6 Note that
Lemma 5 Suppose φ : R → R is measurable and bounded,μ ∈ P and that
Then φ max := max z∈R φ (z) exists andμ ({z; φ (z) = φ max }) = 0.
Proof: Define M = sup φ (R). Let δ x denote the Dirac measure at x ∈ R. Then
Hence φ (z) = M for almost every z with respect toμ and therefore the supremum is achieved andμ ({z; φ (z) = φ max }) = 0. QED Let us now consider bidder i with valuation v. Since Υ is an equilibrium the best reply is τ v . If there is a tie we suppose that the tie is solved with equal probability amongst the winners. Thus if a bidder i bids x he wins with probability
The lemma above implies that
and τ v (A c v ) = 0.
Lemma 6 For every
Proof: First note from expression (6) that H (x) = H (x−) if and only if G (x) = H n−1 (x) . Now ifb ∈ A v and b m ↓b through points of continuity of
Proof: Suppose v < v and that there exist
Adding and collecting terms (v
In (8) I used Lemma 8. Thus
Therefore τ y {b} = 0 for almost every y with respect to F. Hence τ v {b} = 0. QED
Thusx ∈ A v . Analogously we define x : 
Proof: Suppose v ∈ C. Then for every ω ∈ C,
By the right-continuity of b and F this is also true for every ω and for every v. The inequality above is equivalent to
Interchanging v with ω we get:
Thus for every v and ω :
. We have that
by making N → ∞ we get:
The other inequality is obtained from the inequality in (#). QED Thus the pure strategy part is unique. The unicity of the mixed strategy is proved in an analogous manner.
Theorem 4
The mixed strategy τ v is unique for each v ∈ D.
Proof: 
QED
Example and application.
I now show how the general multi-dimensional set of types case is reduced to a one dimensional case in complete generality. Suppose the set of types is the probability space (T, T , P ). A bidder with type t ∈ T has a utility U (t) when receiving the object. The function U : T → R is bounded and measurable. Define If a = b = 1/2 we recover the example in the introduction.
